In this article:
53. What things are required for a mortal sin?
54. From what causes can a mortal sin become venial? I. from
imperfect notice.
55. II. From imperfect consent.
56. III. From the unimportance of the matter.
59. How venial sin becomes mortal, I. on account of the end attached
to it.
60. II. On account of the final end that was intended.
61. III. On account of contempt.
62. IV. On account of scandal.
63. V. On account of the danger of falling into mortal sin.
64. Whether someone would be in the state of mortal sin who purposes
to commit all venial sins?
52. How many
different ways can a sin be mortal? Notable advertence must be made
for those who condemn facile things as mortal sins.
52.—Resp. 2. A
mortal sin is twofold, on the one hand it is deadly by its genus; on
the other hand from its accident. It is deadly by its genus
because in itself it wounds the charity of God, or of our
neighbor in regard to his person, things or rights, or gravely
corrupts our very person (Azor, l. 4, c. 9, Sanchez, l. 1, mor. c 3).
For that reason, the
following are resolved:
1. Sins committed
against someone’s good, as are venial by their genus, such as
uselessness, vain concupiscence, vain delight, prodigality,
curiosity, and superfluous worship or clothing, or trifles, laziness,
excess in food, drink, sleep, laughter, marital relations, fear,
sadness, appetite for money, praise, etc.
2. Sins against the
theological virtues are mortal by their nature, because they harm
some internal good of God, e.g. veracity, mercy, charity. Likewise,
nearly all the things which are done against the Decalogue, because
those which are committed against the first three precepts similarly
harm the Godhead, knowledge, divine omnipotence, and His external or
internal honor, which are done against some precepts, harm the
person, good or right of their neighbor.
3. Those sins
against the seven virtues, which are called capital sins, are not all
mortal sins by their genus, because they do not all gravely wound God
or neighbor, or corrupt our selves. Resp. 3. It is called mortal from
its accident when some act is venial or indifferent, it becomes
mortal per accidens, on which we will treat more below.
Here we must rightly
notice what Roncaglia says (tract. 2. q. 1, c. 1, reg. 1, in
practice) namely, “Where it is clear that something is not a
mortal sin, the confessor would be far amiss in judging such a
transgression to be grave, and to pronounce his judgment of such a
sin on the penitent.” Still, it is very dangerous for
confessors to condemn something as a grave sin, where certitude is
not manifest, as St. Thomas teaches. “Every question in which it
is sought on mortal sin, unless the truth were expressly held, a
determination is dangerous.” (Quodlib. 9, art. 15). He adduces
the reasoning of this doctrine a little later, namely that “an
error, in which something is believed to be mortal that is not, binds
to mortal sin by conscience.” This is why St. Antoninus says:
“Unless one were to have express authority of Sacred Scripture,
or a canon, or a determination of the Church, or at least evident
reason, something will be determined to be a mortal sin only with
very great danger. ... For if something were determined to be mortal,
and it were not mortal, acting against it he will sin because
everything that is against conscience paves the road to hell.”
Next, we learn in such a distinction that those following rigid
doctrines insert themselves, and easily condemn men for mortal sin in
those things in which grave malice does not appear from evident
reason, and so expose them to the danger of eternal damnation;
the same thing must be said about those, who easily impress the mark
of laxity on opinions which clearly do not seem improbable. (see what
was said in book 1, n. 89).
53. What things
are required for a mortal sin?
53.—Resp. 1: Three
things are required for a mortal sin and if one of these is lacking,
it becomes venial, but otherwise, it is mortal of itself. 1) On the
side of the intellect, full knowledge and deliberation. 2) On the
side of the will, perfect consent. 3) Gravity of the matter at least
as much as possible. The reasoning of the first and second part is,
because when one considers human frailty, it does not seem fitting to
divine goodness to punish man with eternal punishments without full
consideration and consent. The reasoning of the third part is, where
the matter is of little moment, there a moderate offense is morally
considered as much as possible.
54. From what
causes can a mortal sin become venial? I. from imperfect notice.
54.—Resp. 2: A sin
that is mortal by its genus, can become venial from three causes, as
is clear from the aforesaid. The first is, if on the side of the
intellect there was not perfect knowledge of the malice or perfect
perfect deliberation. The signs of imperfect deliberation are: a) If
one weakly apprehended that it is evil as if half-asleep. b) If
after, where he might better consider, he would judge that he was not
going to do it if he could have so apprehended it. c) If one labors
with vehement passion, apprehension or distraction, or was
exceedingly disturbed, so that it was almost as if he did not know
what he did. (See what was said in n. 4).
55. II. From
imperfect consent.
55.—The second
cause is on the side of the will, if there was not perfect consent
(as St. Thomas teaches 1.2. q. 88, art. 6. See the aforesaid on
consensus n. 5). Moreover, the sins of imperfect consent are: a) If
one was so disposed that, although he could easily carry out the sin,
still he would not carry it out. b) If someone were hesitant whether
he should consent, especially if he is a devout man. c) If someone
usually is so affected that he prefers to die than expressly commit a
mortal sin, because such does nor easily consent. d) If anyone were
extremely fearful and anxious to recall what appeared. e) If one was
half in a dream and not sufficiently composed, etc., and will judge
that he would not have done it if he were fully awake. (See Sanchez,
1, mor. c. 10, Baldell., l. 10, d. 8)
56. III. From the
unimportance of the matter.
56.—The third
cause is on the side of the matter, if this would be of little
moment. Moreover, when it is such, it must be discerned by a moral
judgment of the prudent, for which the following rules will serve: 1)
that it will be judged on the matter, not only itself secundum se
must absolutely be considered, but also respectively to the end
intended, for which if he does a little thing, it is light, but
grave, if he does much, as Vasquez teaches, 1.2. d. 158. (The rule
is, the smallness of the matter where on account of the smallness the
reasoning of the offense is not excused, as happens in infidelity,
hatred of God, simony, perjury, venereal matters and blasphemy.) 2.
The circumstances must be attended to, because it often happens that
a matter that is of itself light, with attention given to the
circumstances of the common good to avoid scandal, etc., it may
become grave. 3. Whether some part of the matter commanded is grave,
these must be considered both absolutely and secundum se, and
even in order to the whole. 4. In repeated transgressions, if a great
many small matters, either secundum se or according to the
effects produced by themselves, were morally joined the matter
becomes grave, because then all are morally reputed as one. But on
the other hand, then grave matter is not censed if the small matters,
neither secundum se nor according to the effects left behind
were united among themselves.
59. How venial
sin becomes mortal, I. on account of the end attached to it.
59.—There are five
modes in which a venial sin becomes a mortal sin, as the doctors in
common, and particularly Sanchez, teach: 1. By reason of the enjoined
end. 2. By reason of the final end. 3. By reason of contempt. 4. By
reason of scandal. 5. By reason of danger. I shall speak briefly on
each of these.
Resp. 1. A venial sin crosses over into mortal sin by reason of the enjoined end, that if someone would lie in a small way, but to extort carnal relations: because when the end is a mortal sin, it is also mortal. Still, it is not necessary to explain that lie in confession, but only the desire for fornication; because without the malice of mortal sin, it remains venial.
Resp. 1. A venial sin crosses over into mortal sin by reason of the enjoined end, that if someone would lie in a small way, but to extort carnal relations: because when the end is a mortal sin, it is also mortal. Still, it is not necessary to explain that lie in confession, but only the desire for fornication; because without the malice of mortal sin, it remains venial.
60. II. On
account of the final end that was intended.
60.—Resp. 2. It
also crosses into mortal sin, by reason of an excessive affect in
some matter: e.g. one would constitute the last end in it. For this
purpose it does not suffice to be imposed very intensely and
vehemently in the object, but it is required that appreciatively one
should virtually so esteem it that he will be prepared for his sake
of transgressing the precept obliging under mortal sin, that if
anyone would be so inordinately affected to stories, play, person,
that he would prefer a feast and omit mass, etc., than be deprived of
them. (In the case of one who omits Mass for the sake of games, it
suffices for him to confess that he had omitted Mass. See what was
said in number 10. If someone, however, by the love of games was
prepared to commit any mortal sin, it would be a sin of temerity and
indeed very serious, but without a species. The Salamancans tr. 20,
c. 12, p. 2, n. 12, and 13, with Palaus, Azor, Bonacina, Reg.).
Moreover, Bonacina notes this affect is not only habitual, but ought
to be actual, so that sin is contracted because it is not imputed to
that fault, to which he was prepared to commit by habit.
61. III. On
account of contempt.
61.—Resp. 3.
Venial sin becomes mortal by reason of absolute and formal contempt.
I say, however, absolute and formal contempt, namely when a precept
is violated formally and absolutely, because he refuses to be subject
to it or a higher one, which is a sin of consummate pride: or when he
does not wish to obey a precept because there is a precept, and it is
a sin of formal disobedience, each of which is gravely opposed to
charity due to a superior. (Therefore, it is one thing to scorn a
law, or a legislator, even a human one, not quâ such a
person, but quâ the legislator, which is a mortal sin, and
another to scorn a matter commanded, which is venial if the matter is
light. The Salamancans ibid., n. 18, and more profusely in tr. 11, c.
2, p. 2, §4 per totum. See also what is going to be said in book 5,
n. 161, v. Quarta.)
From which the
following are resolved:
1. It is not a mortal sin if you indeed meant to obey and be subject absolutely, but here and now refused in a modest matter; or if you would admit the authority of the law or the one that commands, but here and now pay no heed to the execution. The reason is, because it is not absolute contempt and simpliciter, but only secundum quid.
2. If a precept were abruptly violated from indignation, malice, bad custom, or another cause, and not from contempt of the power of the superior, it is not mortal because it is not formal contempt, but only interpretative.
3. It is a mortal sin to do or omit something from the contempt of a just human law. Likewise, from contempt of God the lawgiver, or even the counselor (which, for that reason, contains a tacit blasphemy, as if God commanded useless things, or merely gave advice); and then to do something from the contempt of a prelate, such a one having authority from God, but not such as a man, unlearned, imprudent, imperfect, because this by and by is not to scorn absolutely and simply, but only secundum quid. (See Sanchez, 1. mor. c. 5; Bonacina, de peccat. d. 2, q. 3, p. 5).
1. It is not a mortal sin if you indeed meant to obey and be subject absolutely, but here and now refused in a modest matter; or if you would admit the authority of the law or the one that commands, but here and now pay no heed to the execution. The reason is, because it is not absolute contempt and simpliciter, but only secundum quid.
2. If a precept were abruptly violated from indignation, malice, bad custom, or another cause, and not from contempt of the power of the superior, it is not mortal because it is not formal contempt, but only interpretative.
3. It is a mortal sin to do or omit something from the contempt of a just human law. Likewise, from contempt of God the lawgiver, or even the counselor (which, for that reason, contains a tacit blasphemy, as if God commanded useless things, or merely gave advice); and then to do something from the contempt of a prelate, such a one having authority from God, but not such as a man, unlearned, imprudent, imperfect, because this by and by is not to scorn absolutely and simply, but only secundum quid. (See Sanchez, 1. mor. c. 5; Bonacina, de peccat. d. 2, q. 3, p. 5).
62. IV. On
account of scandal.
62.—Resp. 4.
Venial sin, or an indifferent work having a species of evil, crosses
over per accidens into mortal sin, if the ruin through it that
were caused to a neighbor were mortal. The reason is, because in such
a work something gravely opposed to charity is superadded. (See what
is going to be said on scandal, as well as Filliuci, t. 21, c. 5, q.
10, n. 212).
63. V. On account
of the danger of falling into mortal sin.
63.—Resp. 5. A
venial sin, or an indifferent work, crosses over into mortal sin by
reason of the danger of falling into mortal sin when someone, without
sufficient caution, does something from necessity through which he
may come into moral and proximate danger of sinning mortally, because
he has such contempt for his eternal salvation that he would expose
himself rashly to such probable danger. For this reason, in
confession the species of the sin must be explained, by the danger of
which he opposes himself, because he sinned in the same genus of sin.
Moreover, proximate danger is supposed because frequently men of a
similar condition lead him into mortal sin.
Question: Whether
one sins mortally who exposes himself to a merely probable danger of
sinning mortally?
The first opinion with Sporer (de poen. cap. 2, n. 342), and Gob., Hozes, Lumbier, Murc., etc. all cited by Croix (l. 5, n. 257, etc.), rejects this, because (as they say), when in that case it is also probable that there is no danger of sinning, he does not act rashly who commits a sin on such an occasion; for where the danger is not certain, there cannot be present a certain obligation to avoid it. But the opposite must altogether be held, with Busembaum (as above), whom Croix (loc. cit.) follows, with Carden., Eliz., and others. The convincing reason is that if it is illicit to use probable opinion without a just cause with the danger of loss of another’s spiritual or temporal goods, it is also certain among all, how much more it will not be lawful where the danger threatens his own soul? Nor is it opposed to say that where the danger is probable, there also it is probable that there is no danger: for the response is made that in that case, although the sin will be uncertain, whether it were or were not committed, still it is certain that there is danger of sinning. We said without a just cause, for where a just cause is present, there is no obligation of avoiding such a danger, unless the fall into sin were morally foreseen as a certainty. (See what is going to be said in book 3, n. 26, v. Pariter). And so physicians are excused, if they expose themselves to the danger of death to heal women ... so also a parish priest...
The first opinion with Sporer (de poen. cap. 2, n. 342), and Gob., Hozes, Lumbier, Murc., etc. all cited by Croix (l. 5, n. 257, etc.), rejects this, because (as they say), when in that case it is also probable that there is no danger of sinning, he does not act rashly who commits a sin on such an occasion; for where the danger is not certain, there cannot be present a certain obligation to avoid it. But the opposite must altogether be held, with Busembaum (as above), whom Croix (loc. cit.) follows, with Carden., Eliz., and others. The convincing reason is that if it is illicit to use probable opinion without a just cause with the danger of loss of another’s spiritual or temporal goods, it is also certain among all, how much more it will not be lawful where the danger threatens his own soul? Nor is it opposed to say that where the danger is probable, there also it is probable that there is no danger: for the response is made that in that case, although the sin will be uncertain, whether it were or were not committed, still it is certain that there is danger of sinning. We said without a just cause, for where a just cause is present, there is no obligation of avoiding such a danger, unless the fall into sin were morally foreseen as a certainty. (See what is going to be said in book 3, n. 26, v. Pariter). And so physicians are excused, if they expose themselves to the danger of death to heal women ... so also a parish priest...
The reason is
because the danger that is proximate of itself both becomes remote by
reason of the circumstance of necessity, and at the same time by
reason of means to beware of, which the person proposes (as is held)
to apply namely, diligently by adverting the mind from foul
delectation or from another passion, and moreover by
fortifying himself with pious thoughts, prayers and frequent use of
the sacraments. Which means, although they do not suffice to excuse,
where the just cause is not present, to the extent that God does not
help rashly exposing himself to danger, still he furnishes his aid to
one who, from a just cause does not forsake, while in that case he
did not remain from affect to sin, but from a certain necessity in
that occasion. Otherwise, it must be said about simple confessors who
fell a great many times in hearing confessions, because they are held
to abstain from such exercise... But indeed, if someone in those
occasions had lapsed and did not show off hope of emendation? See
what is going to be said in the same place, n. 438, where we will say
this must be held with each lost occasion to desert and save his
soul. (See also what is going to be said in book 6, n. 453.)
64. Whether
someone would be in the state of mortal sin who purposes to commit
all venial sins?
64.—Whether,
however, there were in the state of mortal sin, one who proposed to
commit all venial sins? See what must be said in book 5, n. 12, vers.
Quaeriutur autem.
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