Question 88. Vows
- What is a vow?
- What is the matter of a vow?
- The obligation of vows
- The use of taking vows
- Of what virtue is it an act?
- Is it more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than without a vow?
- The solemnizing of a vow
- Can those who are under another's power take vows?
- May children be bound by vow to enter religion?
- Is a vow subject to dispensation or commutation?
- Can a dispensation be granted in a solemn vow of continence?
- Is the authority of a superior required in a dispensation from a vow?
Article 1. Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?
Objection 1. It would seem that a
vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the
will. According to some [
William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1;
Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38, "a
vow is a conception of a
good purpose after a firm deliberation of the
mind, whereby a man binds himself before
God to do or not to do a certain thing." But the conception of a
good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere movement of the
will. Therefore a
vow consists in a mere purpose of the
will.
Objection 2. Further, the very word
vow seems to be derived from "voluntas" [will], for one is said to do a thing "proprio voto" [by one's own
vow] when one does it
voluntarily. Now to "purpose" is an act of the
will, while to "promise" is an act of the reason. Therefore a
vow consists in a mere act of the
will.
Objection 3. Further,
our Lord said (
Luke 9:62): "No
man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the
kingdom of God." Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing
good, he puts his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from his
good purpose, he is not fit for the
kingdom of God. Therefore by a mere
good purpose a man is bound before
God, even without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a
vow consists in a mere purpose of the
will.
On the contrary, It is written (
Ecclesiastes 5:3): "If thou hast vowed anything to
God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him." Therefore to
vow is to promise, and a
vow is a promise.
I answer that, A
vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now one
man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or
praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between
man and
mancan only be expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be made to
God by the mere inward thought, since according to
1 Samuel 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard to
prayer (
II-II:83:12), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from breaking the
vow, not only through fear of
God, but also through respect of
men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are
essential to a
vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the
will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the
nature of a
vow. Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of confirmation of the
vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth, according to
Psalm 65:13, "I will pay Thee my
vows which my lips have uttered"; and the witnessing of others. Hence the
Mastersays (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a
vow is "the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to
God and about things relating to
God": although the "witnessing" may strictly refer to the inward protestation.
Reply to Objection 1. The conceiving of a
good purpose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the
mind, unless the deliberation lead to a promise.
Reply to Objection 2. Man's will moves the reason to promise something relating to things subject to his will, and a
vow takes its name from the
will forasmuch as it proceeds from the
will as first mover.
Reply to Objection 3. He that puts his hand to the plough does something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.
Article 2. Whether a vow should always be about a better good?
Objection 2. Further, Jephte is included among the
saints (
Hebrews 11:32). Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his
vow (
Judges 11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent
person is not a better
good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a
vow may be made not only about a better
good, but also about something unlawful.
Objection 3. Further, things that tend to be harmful to the
person, or that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better
good. Yet sometimes
vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to injure the
person: and sometimes
vows are about indifferent matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a
vow is not always about a better
good.
On the contrary, It is written (
Deuteronomy 23:22): "If thou wilt not promise thou shalt be without
sin."
I answer that, As stated above (
Article 1), a
vow is a promise made to
God. Now a promise is about something that one does
voluntarily for someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say that one would do something against someone. On like manner it would be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as every
sin is against
God, and since no work is acceptable to
God unless it be
virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but only some act of
virtue, should be the
matter of a
vow. But as a
vow denotes a
voluntary promise, while
necessity excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely
necessary, whether to be or not to be, can nowise be the
matter of a
vow. For it would be foolish to
vow that one would die or that one would not fly.
On the other hand, if a thing be
necessary. not absolutely but on the supposition of an end—for instance if
salvation be unattainable without it—it may be the
matter of a
vow in so far as it is done
voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a
necessity for doing it. But that which is not
necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an end, is altogether
voluntary, and therefore is most properly the
matter of a
vow. And this is said to be a greater
good in comparison with that which is universally
necessary for
salvation. Therefore, properly speaking, a
vow is said to be about a better
good.
Reply to Objection 1. Renouncing the
devil's pomps and keeping the
faith of
Christare the
matter of baptismal
vows, in so far as these things are done
voluntarily, although they are
necessary for
salvation. The same answer applies to
Jacob's vow: although it may also be explained that
Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his
God, by giving Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance by offering
tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same passage.
Reply to Objection 2. Certain things are
good, whatever be their result; such are acts of
virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the
matter of a
vow: some are
evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which are
sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the
matter of a
vow: while some, considered in themselves, are
good, and as such may be the
matter of a
vow, yet they may have an
evil result, in which case the
vow must not be kept. It was thus with the
vow of Jephte, who as related in
Judges 11:30-31, "made a
vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a
holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an
evil result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a
human being. Hence
Jerome says [Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii: Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist. Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in keeping his
vow he was
wicked." Yet it is premised (
Judges 11:29) that "the
Spirit of the Lordcame upon him," because his
faith and devotion, which moved him to make that
vow, were from the
Holy Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the
saints, as also by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he repented of his
sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something
good.
Reply to Objection 3. The mortification of one's own body, for instance by vigils and
fasting, is not acceptable to
God except in so far as it is an act of
virtue; and this depends on its being done with due discretion, namely, that
concupiscence be curbed without overburdening
nature. on this
condition such things may be the
matter of a
vow. Hence the
Apostle after saying (
Romans 12:1), "Present your bodies a living sacrifice,
holy, pleasing to
God," adds, "your reasonable service." Since, however,
man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself, such
vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a superior, yet so that, should a man find that without
doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a
vow, and should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to
vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.
Article 3. Whether all vows are binding?
Objection 1. It would seem that
vows are not all binding. For
man needs things that are done by another, more than
God does, since He has no need for our goods (
Psalm 15:2). Now according to the prescription of
human laws [Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple promise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness of the
human will. Much less binding therefore is a simple promise made to
God, which we call a
vow.
Objection 2. Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man
vows to enter a monastery, the
monks of which refuse to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance when a
woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a man
vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a
vow is not always binding.
Objection 3. Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to pay his
vow at once, especially if it be taken under a
condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a
vow is not always binding.
On the contrary, It is written (
Ecclesiastes 5:3-4): "Whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to
vow, than after a
vow not to perform the things promised."
I answer that, For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's promises. Wherefore, according to
Augustine [Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac. xx]
faith takes its name "from a man's
deed agreeing with his word" ['Fides . . . fiunt dicta' Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic. i, 7)]. Now
man ought to be faithful to
God above all, both on account of
God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from
God. Hence
man is
obliged before all to fulfill the
vows he has made to
God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to
God. On the other hand, the breaking of a
vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why
vows should be paid to
God, because "an unfaithful . . . promise displeaseth Him" [
Ecclesiastes 5:3.
Reply to Objection 1. Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he makes to another
man, and this
obligation is based on the
natural law. But for a man to be under a civil
obligation through a promise he has made, other
conditions are requisite. And although
God needs not our goods, we are under a very great
obligation to Him: so that a
vow made to Him is most binding.
Reply to Objection 2. If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him through any
cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be received there. And if his
intention was chiefly to bind himself to enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal
intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. on the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his
vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault: thus if a
woman has vowed
virginity and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely, perpetual
continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by
sinning.
Reply to Objection 3. The
obligation of a
vow is
caused by our own will and
intention, wherefore it is written (
Deuteronomy 23:23): "That which is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised to the
Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and with thy own mouth." Wherefore if in taking a
vow, it is one's
intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound to fulfil it immediately.
But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain
condition, one is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for it is written (
Deuteronomy 23:21): "When thou hast made a
vow to the
Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the
Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a
sin."
Article 4. Whether it is expedient to take vows?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is not expedient to take
vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the
good that
God has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that
God has given
man is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the
necessity implicated in a
vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for
man to take
vows.
Objection 2. Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever takes a
vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before taking a
vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the
vow. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less
good: whereas now if thou breakest
faith with
God (which
God forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been
happier, hadst thou kept thy
vow." Therefore it is not expedient to take
vows.
On the contrary, It is written (
Psalm 75:12): "Vow ye and pay to the Lord your
God."
I answer that, As stated above (
1 and 2), a
vow is a promise made to
God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to
God under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that service: whereas we make promises to
God not for His but for our own profit. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "He is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him." And just as what we give
God is useful not to Him but to us, since "what is given Him is added to the giver," as
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we
vow something to
God, does not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to take
vows.
Reply to Objection 1. Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable to
sin, so, too, the
necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed to
good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in
God and the blessed. Such is the
necessity implied by a
vow, bearing a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence,
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "
happy is the
necessity that compels us to do the better things."
Reply to Objection 2. When danger arises from the
deed itself, this
deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through
man's failure in the
deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all
good things, that may become dangerous
accidentally. Wherefore it is written (
Ecclesiastes 11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger, not from the
vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking his
vow. Hence,
Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Repent not of thy
vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment."
Reply to Objection 3. It was incompetent for
Christ, by His very
nature, to take a
vow, both because He was
God, and because, as
man, His
will was firmly fixed on the
good, since He was a "comprehensor." By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (
Psalm 21:26): "I will pay my
vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is speaking of His body, which is the
Church.
The
apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state of perfection when "they left all things and followed
Christ."
Article 5. Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion?
Objection 1. It would seem that a
vow is not an act of latria or religion. Every act of
virtue is
matter for a
vow. Now it would seem to pertain to the same
virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a
vow pertains to any
virtue and not to religion especially.
Objection 2. Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to religion to offer
God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes a
vow does not yet offer something to
God, but only promises it. Therefore, a
vow is not an act of religion.
Objection 3. Further, religious worship should be offered to none but
God. But a
vowis made not only to
God, but also to the
saints and to one's superiors, to whom
religious vow obedience when they make their profession. Therefore, a
vow is not an act of religion.
On the contrary, It is written (
Isaiah 19:21): "(The Egyptians) shall worship Him with
sacrifices and offerings and they shall make
vows to the Lord, and perform them." Now, the worship of
God is properly the act of religion or
latria. Therefore, a
vow is an act of latria or religion.
I answer that, As stated above (
II-II:81:1 ad 1), every act of
virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it is directed to the reverence of
God which is the proper end of
latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding
virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the direction of the acts of any
virtue to the service of
God is the proper act of
latria.
Now, it is evident from what has been said above (
1 and 2) that a
vow is a promise made to
God, and that a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing promised to the
person to whom the promise is made. Hence a
vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or service of
God. And thus it is clear that to take a
vow is properly an act of latria or religion.
Reply to Objection 1. The
matter of a
vow is sometimes the act of another
virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing
continency; while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or
praying.
But promising either of them to
God belongs to religion, for the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some
vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise made to
God, which is the
essence of a
vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the thing promised, which is the
matter of the
vow.
Reply to Objection 2. He who promises something gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when its
cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its
cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises to give.
Reply to Objection 3. A
vow is made to
God alone, whereas a promise may be made to a man also: and this very promise of
good, which is fore made to a man, may be the
matter of a
vow, and in so far as it is a
virtuous act. This is how we are to understand
vows whereby we
vow something to the
saints or to one's superiors: so that the promise made to the
saints or to one's superiors is the
matter of the
vow, in so far as one
vows to
God to fulfil what one has promised to the
saints or one's superiors.
Article 6. Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in fulfilment of a vow, than without a vow?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and
meritorious to do a thing without a
vow than in fulfilment of a
vow. Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): "We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves under the
necessity of
fasting, lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." Now he who
vows to fast puts himself under the
necessity of
fasting. Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the
vow.
Objection 2. Further, the
Apostle says (
2 Corinthians 9:7): "Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of
necessity: for
God loveth a cheerful giver." Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed: and this seems to be due to the
necessity arising from the
vow, for
necessity is a
cause of sorrow according to Metaph. v [Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a
vow, than in fulfilment of a
vow.
Objection 3. Further, a
vow is
necessary for the purpose of fixing the
will on that which is vowed, as stated above (
Article 4). But the
will cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a
vow than without a
vow.
On the contrary, A
gloss on the words of
Psalm 75:12, "Vow ye and pay," says: "Vows are counseled to the
will." But a counsel is about none but a better
good. Therefore it is better to do a
deed in fulfilment of a
vow than without a
vow: since he that does it without a
vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it with a
vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to
vow and the counsel to do it.
I answer that, For three reasons it is better and more
meritorious to do one and the same
deed with a
vow than without. First, because to
vow, as stated above (
Article 5) is an act of religion which is the chief of the moral
virtues. Now the more excellent the
virtue the better and more
meritorious the
deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior
virtue is the better the more
meritorious for being commanded by a superior
virtue, whose act it becomes through being commanded by it, just as the act of
faith or hope is better if it be commanded by
charity. Hence the works of the other moral
virtues(for instance,
fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being continent, which is an act of
chastity) are better and more
meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a
vow, since thus they belong to the divine worship, being like
sacrifices to
God. Wherefore
Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that "not even is
virginity honorable as such, but only when it is
consecrated to
God, and cherished by godly
continence."
Secondly, because he that
vows something and does it, subjects himself to
God more than he that only does it; for he subjects himself to
God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm [Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank even those who promise, as stated above (
Article 5, Reply to Objection 2).
Thirdly, because a
vow fixes the
will on the
good immovably and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the
good belongs to the perfection of
virtue, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to
sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the
sin, and is called a
sin against the
Holy Ghost, as stated above (
II-II:14:2).
Reply to Objection 1. The passage quoted should be understood as referring to
necessity of coercion which
causes an act to be involuntary and excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On the other hand the
necessity resulting from a
vow is
caused by the immobility of the
will, wherefore it strengthens the
will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.
Reply to Objection 2. According to the
Philosopher,
necessity of coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the
will,
causes sorrow. But the
necessity resulting from a
vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strengthens the
will,
causes not sorrow but
joy. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy
vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If, however, the very
deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary after one has taken the
vow, the
will to fulfil it remaining withal, it is still more
meritorious than if it were done without the
vow, since the fulfilment of a
vow is an act of religion which is a greater
virtue than abstinence, of which
fasting is an act.
Reply to Objection 3. He who does something without having vowed it has an immovable will as regards the
individual deed which he does and at the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed for the time to come, as does the
will of one who makes a
vow: for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did that particular
deed, and perchance to do it many times.
Article 7. Whether a vow is solemnized by the reception of holy orders, and by the profession of a certain rule?
Objection 1. It would seem that a
vow is not solemnized by the reception of
holyorders and by the profession of a certain rule. As stated above (
Article 1), a
vow is a promise made to
God. Now external actions pertaining to
solemnity seem to be directed, not to
God, but to
men. Therefore they are related to
vows accidentally: and consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper circumstance of a
vow.
Objection 2. Further, whatever belongs to the
condition of a thing, would seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many things may be the subject of a
vow, which have no connection either with
holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man
vows a pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization that takes place in the reception of
holy orders or in the profession of a certain rule does not belong to the
condition of a
vow.
Objection 3. Further, a
solemn vow seems to be the same as a public
vow. Now many other
vows may be made in public besides that which is pronounced in receiving
holy orders or in professing a certain rule; which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only these
vows are
solemn.
On the contrary, These
vows alone are an impediment to the contract of marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the effect of a
solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third Part of this work [
Supplement:53:2].
I answer that, The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its
nature[conditio]: thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes the fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of their kindred. Now a
vow is a promise made to
God: wherefore, the solemnization of a
vow consists in something
spiritual pertaining to
God; i.e. in some
spiritual blessing or
consecration which, in accordance with the institution of the
apostles, is given when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the second degree after the reception of
holy orders, as
Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not wont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only when the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. On like manner a
vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine ministry by receiving
holyorders, or embraces the state of perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession of a certain rule.
Reply to Objection 1. This kind of solemnization regards not only men but also
Godin so far as it is accompanied by a
spiritual consecration or
blessing, of which
God is the author, though
man is the minister, according to
Numbers 6:27, "They shall invoke My name upon the children of
Israel, and I will
bless them." Hence a
solemnvow is more binding with
God than a simple
vow, and he who breaks a
solemn vowsins more grievously. When it is said that a simple
vow is no less binding than a
solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either commits a mortal
sin.
Reply to Objection 2. It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man
vows particular
deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast, such a
vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the
vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or service: and yet many particular works are included under this
vowas under a universal.
Reply to Objection 3. Through being pronounced in public
vows may have a certain
human solemnity, but not a
spiritual and divine
solemnity, as the aforesaid
vowshave, even when they are pronounced before a few
persons. Hence the publicity of a
vow differs from its solemnization.
Article 8. Whether those who are subject to another's power are hindered from taking vows?
Objection 1. It would seem that those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking
vows. The lesser bond is surpassed by the greater. Now the
obligation of one
man subject to another is a lesser bond than a
vow whereby one is under an
obligation to
God. Therefore those who are subject to another's power are not hindered from taking
vows.
Objection 2. Further, children are under their parents' power. Yet children may make
religious profession even without the consent of their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking
vows, through being subject to another's power.
Objection 3. Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly can they promise such things to
God by means of
vows.
Objection 4. Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully
sins. But subjects do not
sin by taking
vows, since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take
vows.
On the contrary, It is commanded (
Numbers 30:4-6) that "if a
woman vow any thing . . . being in her father's house, and yet but a girl in age," she is not bound by the
vow, unless her father consent: and the same is said there (
Numbers 30:7-9) of the
woman that has a husband. Therefore in like manner other
persons that are subject to another's power cannot bind themselves by
vow.
I answer that, As stated above (
Article 1), a
vow is a promise made to
God. Now no
man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in another's power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power. Now whoever is subject to another, as to the
matter wherein he is subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the
will of the other. And therefore without the consent of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a
vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another.
Reply to Objection 1. Nothing but what is
virtuous can be the subject of a promise made to
God, as stated above (
Article 2). Now it is contrary to
virtue for a man to offer to
God that which belongs to another, as stated above (
II-II:86:3). Hence the
conditions necessary for a
vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another's power
vows that which is in that other's power, except under the
conditionthat he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.
Reply to Objection 2. As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters concerning his
person, for instance with regard to binding himself by
vow to enter religion, or with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot
vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his father.
A
slave, through being in his master's power, even as regards his personal
deeds, cannot bind himself by
vow to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his master's service.
Reply to Objection 3. A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one's superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no
vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the
vow of a girl while in (her father's) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.
Reply to Objection 4. Although the
vow of one who is subject to another's power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not
sinby vowing; because his
vow is understood to contain the requisite
condition, providing, namely, that his superior approve or do not gainsay it.
Article 9. Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion?
Objection 1. It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by
vow to enter religion. Since a
vow requires deliberation of the
mind, it is fitting that those alone should
vow who have the use of
reason. But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and
madmen. Therefore just as imbeciles and
madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by
vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves by
vow to enter religion.
Objection 2. Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be annulled by another. Now a
vow to enter religion made by a boy or girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl cannot validly make a
vow before the age of fourteen.
Objection 3. Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [Ch. 58 and a statute of
Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the
obligation of the
vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation, for children to be bound by
vow to enter religion.
On the contrary, That which is not done aright is invalid without being annulled by anyone. But the
vow pronounced by a
maiden, even before attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a
vow to enter religion.
I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said above (
Article 7),
vowsare of two kinds, simple and
solemn. And since, as stated in the same article, the solemnization of a
vow consists in a
spiritual blessing and
consecration bestowed through the ministry of the
Church, it follows that it comes under the
Church'sdispensation. Now a simple
vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the
mind, whereby one intends to put oneself under an
obligation. That such an
obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defect of
reason, as in
madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by
vow so long as they remain in a state of
madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a
vow being subject to another's power, as stated above (
Article 8). Now these two circumstances concur in children before the age of puberty, because in most instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are
naturally under the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents: wherefore in both events their
vows are without force. It happens, however, through a
natural disposition which is not subject to
human laws, that the use of
reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to
human law, which takes into account that which is of most frequent occurrence.
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the years of puberty and have not attained the use of
reason can nowise bind themselves to anything by
vow. If, however, they attain the use of
reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own part, bind themselves by
vow; but their
vows can be annulled by their parents, under whose care they are still subject.
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of puberty, they cannot be bound by a
solemn religious vow, on account of the
Church's decree [Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious
vows, simple or
solemn, without the consent of their parents.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument avails in the case of children who have not yet reached the use of
reason: for their
vows then are invalid, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2. The
vows of
persons subject to another's power contain an implied
condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the superior. This
conditionrenders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3. This argument avails in the case of
solemn vows which are taken in profession.
Article 10. Whether vows admit of dispensation?
Objection 1. It would seem that
vows are not subject to dispensation. It is less to have a
vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it. But a
vow cannot be commuted, according to
Leviticus 27:9-10, "A beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall
vow, shall be
holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a better." Much less, therefore, do
vows admit of dispensation.
Objection 2. Further, no
man can grant a
dispensation in matters concerning the
natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of
God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a
vow is a matter of the
natural law, and is commanded by the
Divine law, as shown above (
Article 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore
vows do not admit of dispensation.
On the contrary, That which proceeds from the common will of many has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the
individual will of some one
person. Now the
law which derives its force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it seems that
vows also admit of dispensation by a man.
I answer that, The dispensation from a
vow is to be taken in the same sense as a
dispensation given in the observance of a
law because, as stated above (
I-II:96:6;
I-II:97:4), a
law is made with an eye to that which is
good in the majority of instances. But since, in certain cases this is not
good, there is need for someone to decide that in that particular case the
law is not to be observed. This is properly speaking to dispense in the
law: for a
dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or application of some common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a
person is said to dispense food to a household.
In like manner a
person who takes a
vow makes a
law for himself as it were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the majority of cases is a
good. But it may happen that in some particular case this is simply
evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater
good: and this is
essentially contrary to that which is the
matter of a
vow, as is clear from what has been said above (
Article 2). Therefore it is
necessary, in such a case, to decide that the
vow is not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular
vow is not to be observed, this is called a "dispensation" from that
vow; but if some other
obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was to have been observed, the
vow is said to be "commuted." Hence it is less to commute a
vow than to dispense from a
vow: both, however, are in the power of the
Church.
Reply to Objection 1. An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed
holyfrom the very moment that it was the subject of a
vow, being, as it were, dedicated to the worship of
God: and for this reason it could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be already
consecrated, e.g. a
chalice or a house. On the other hand, an animal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful
matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the
law requires. Even so,
vows can be commuted now, if no
consecration has intervened.
Reply to Objection 2. Even as
man is bound by
natural law and Divine precept to fulfil his
vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey the
law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed from keeping a
human law, this does not involve disobedience to that
human law, for this would be contrary to the
natural law and the Divine command; but it amounts to this—that what was
law is not
law in this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a
dispensation, that which was contained under a
vow is by his authority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and such a thing is not fitting
matter for a
vow. Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a
vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the
natural or of the
Divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a
matter to which a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every circumstance.
Reply to Objection 3. The fidelity we owe to
God does not require that we fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to
vow, or which would be an obstacle to the greater
good whereunto the dispensation from that
vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a
vow is not contrary to the fidelity due to
God.
Article 11. Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a
solemn vow of
continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a
dispensation from a
vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater
good. But a
vow of
continency, even though it be
solemn, may be an obstacle to a greater
good, since the common
good is more God-like than the
good of an
individual. Now one
man's continency may be an obstacle to the
goodof the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if certain
persons who have vowed
continency were to marry, the peace of their country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be dispensed even from a
solemn vow of
continency.
Objection 2. Further, religion is a more excellent
virtue than
chastity. Now if a man
vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice to
God he can be dispensed from that
vow. Much more, therefore, can he be dispensed from the
vow of
continency which is about an act of
chastity.
Objection 3. Further, just as the observance of a
vow of abstinence may be a source of danger to the
person, so too may be the observance of a
vow of
continency. Now one who takes a
vow of abstinence can be dispensed from that
vow if it
prove a source of danger to his body. Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a
vow of
continency.
On the contrary, It is written (
Sirach 26:20): "No price is worthy of a continent
soul."
Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the
Decretal, Cum ad Monasterium it is stated that the "renouncing of property, like the keeping of
chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that not even the
Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance."
I answer that, Three things may be considered in a
solemn vow of
continency: first, the
matter of the
vow, namely,
continency; secondly, the perpetuity of the
vow, namely, when a
person binds himself by
vow to the perpetual observance of
chastity: thirdly, the
solemnity of the
vow. Accordingly, some [
William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5 say that the
solemn vow cannot be a matter of dispensation, on account of the
continency itself for which no worthy price can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by
continency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by
continency man is perfectly conformed to
Christ in respect of purity of both body and
soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the
soul, such as
contemplation and
prayer, far surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to
God, and yet one may be dispensed from a
vow of
prayer or
contemplation. Therefore,
continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason why the
solemnvow thereof cannot be a matter of dispensation; especially seeing that the
Apostle (
1 Corinthians 7:34) exhorts us to be continent on account of
contemplation, when he says that the unmarried
woman . . . "thinketh on the things of
God [
Vulgate: 'the Lord']," and since the end is of more account than the means.
Consequently others [
Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38 find the reason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this
vow. For they assert that the
vow of
continencycannot be canceled, save by something altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any
vow. But this is evidently
false, because just as the practice of carnal intercourse is contrary to
continency, so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these latter
vows may be a
matter for dispensation.
For this reason others [
Innocent IV, on the above
decretal] maintain that one may be dispensed even from a
solemn vow of
continency, for the sake of some common
goodor common need, as in the case of the example given above (Objection 1), of a country being restored to peace through a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the
Decretal quoted says explicitly that "not even the
Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a
monk from keeping
chastity," it follows seemingly, that we must maintain that, as stated above (
Article 10, Reply to Objection 1; cf.
Leviticus 27:9-28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to any other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose its
consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, for instance a
consecrated chalice to be not
consecrated, so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate make a man that is
consecrated to
God cease to be
consecrated, so long as he lives. Now the
solemnity of a
vow consists in a kind of
consecration or
blessing of the
person who takes the
vow, as stated above (
Article 7). Hence no prelate of the
Church can make a man, who has pronounced a
solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he was
consecrated, e.g. one who is a
priest, to be a
priest no more, although a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from exercising his order. On like manner the Pope cannot make a man who has made his
religious profession cease to be a religious, although certain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary.
We must therefore consider whether
continency is
essentially bound up with the purpose for which the
vow is solemnized. because if not, the
solemnity of the
consecration can remain without the
obligation of
continency, but not if
continency is
essentially bound up with that for which the
vow is solemnized. Now the
obligation of observing
continency is connected with
Holy Orders, not
essentially but by the institution of the
Church; wherefore it seems that the
Church can grant a
dispensation from the
vow of
continency solemnized by the reception of Holy Orders. on the other hand the
obligation of observing;
continency is an
essential condition of the religious state, whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to
God's service, for this is incompatible with
matrimony, in which state a man is under the
obligation of taking to himself a wife, of begetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring whatever is
necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the
Apostle says (
1 Corinthians 7:33) that "he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided." Hence the "
monk" takes his name from "unity" [The Greek
monos] in contrast with this division. For this reason the
Church cannot dispense from a
vow solemnized by the
religious profession; and the reason assigned by the
Decretal is because "
chastity is bound up with the monastic rule."
Reply to Objection 1. Perils occasioned by
human affairs should be obviated by
human means, not by turning divine things to a
human use. Now a professed religious is dead to the world and lives to
God, and so he must not be called back to the
human life on the pretext of any
human contingency.
Reply to Objection 2. A
vow of temporal
continency can be a matter of dispensation, as also a
vow of temporal
prayer or of temporal abstinence.
But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a
vow of
continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being an act of
chastity, but because through the
religious profession it is already an act of religion.
Reply to Objection 3. Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the
person, therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to the
person: and so on this count a
vow of abstinence is a matter of dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly ordered to the upkeep not of the
person but of the
species, wherefore to abstain from such intercourse by
continency does not endanger the
person. And if indeed
accidentally it
prove a source of danger to the
person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance by abstinence, or other corporal remedies.
Reply to Objection 4. A religious who is made a
bishop is no more
absolved from his
vow of
poverty than from his
vow of
continency, since he must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the dispenser of the common goods of the
Church. On like manner neither is he dispensed from his
vow of obedience; it is an
accident that he is not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his
vow of obedience.
The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of the flesh nor any bodily
good is to be compared with
continency, which is reckoned one of the goods of the
soul, as
Augustine declares (De Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a continent
soul," not "of a continent body."
Article 12. Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the dispensation of a vow?
Objection 1. It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not required for the commutation or dispensation of a
vow. A
person may enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by entering religion one is
absolved from the
vows he made in the world, even from the
vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or dispensation of a
vow is possible without the authority of a superior prelate.
Objection 2. Further, to dispense anyone from a
vow seems to consist in deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that
vow. But if the prelate is at fault in his decision, the
person who took the
vow does not seem to be
absolved from his
vow, since no prelate can grant a
dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's
vows, as stated above (
Article 10, Reply to Objection 2;
Article 11). Likewise, when anyone rightly determines of his own authority that in his case a
vow is not to be kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a
vow need not be kept if it have an
evil result (
Article 2, Reply to Objection 2). Therefore the Authority of a prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a
vow.
Objection 3. Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant dispensations from
vows, on the same count it is competent to all
prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every
vow. Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense from
vows.
I answer that, As stated above (
1 and 2), a
vow is a promise made to
God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise something to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what you promise. Again in the
Church a prelate stands in
God's place. Therefore a commutation or dispensation of
vows requires the authority of a prelate who in
God's stead declares what is acceptable to
God, according to
2 Corinthians 2:10: "For . . . have pardoned . . . for your sakes . . . in the
person of
Christ." And he says significantly "for your sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a
dispensation we should do so to
honor Christ in Whose
person he dispenses, or to promote the interests of the
Church which is His Body.
Reply to Objection 1. All other
vows are about some particular works, whereas by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to
God's service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a
Decretal [Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that "a man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the perpetual service of religion." And yet a man who enters religion is not bound to fulfil the
vows, whether of
fasting or of
praying or the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring the addition of other burdens.
Reply to Objection 2. Some have held that
prelates can dispense from
vows at their will, for the reason that every
vow supposes as a
condition that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above (
Article 8) that the
vow of a subject, e.g. of a
slave or a son, supposes this
condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does not dissent." And thus a subject might break his
vow without any remorse of
conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.
But this opinion is based on a
false supposition: because a
spiritual prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given "unto edification, not for destruction" (
2 Corinthians 10:8), and consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to
God, namely,
sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleasing to
God, namely, works of
virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking
man can
vowthem. But it does belong to a prelate to decide what is the more
virtuous and the more acceptable to
God. Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's dispensation would not excuse one from
sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense a
person from a
vow to enter the religious life, without any apparent
cause to prevent him from fulfilling his
vow. But if some
cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to
doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation or of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgment in the
matter, because he does not stand in the place of
God; except perhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate.
Reply to Objection 3. Since the
Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of
Christthroughout the whole
Church, he exercises absolute power of dispensing from all
vows that admit of dispensation. To other and inferior
prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those
vows that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the
vows of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.),
fasting and the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the
Sovereign Pontiff[Cap. Ex multa].
